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merce meet the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirement. 62 The substantial
effect test may be less clear than the "one transaction across state lines"
standard enunciated by the instant Court, but it is more reflective of the social
policy served by the antitrust laws. The Court's refusal to use this test in the
instant case portends an unwarranted restriction on future enforcement of
antitrust statutes.
JOHN H. MOYNAHAN, JR.

TAX LAW: QUICK TERMINATIONS THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FINDS A DEFICIENCY IN IRS PROCEDURES
Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 19687 (5th Cir. 1974)
Subsequent to seizure of appellee's property by federal narcotics agents, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) terminated his taxable year pursuant to section 6851 of the Internal Revenue Code' and levied on his property to collect
2
the tax owed. The district court ordered that assessment and levy be enjoined
unless the IRS issued a notice of deficiency within sixty days.3 On appeal, the
62. See note 26 supra.
I. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6851 provides: "(1) In general - if the Secretary or his
delegate finds that a taxpayer designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove
his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act
tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax for the current or the preceding taxable year, unless such proceedings be brought
without delay, the Secretary or his delegate shall declare the taxable period for such taxpayer immediately terminated, and shall cause notice of such finding and declaration to be
given the taxpayer together with a demand for immediate payment of the tax for the
taxable period so declared terminated and of the tax for the preceding taxable year or so
much of such tax as is unpaid, whether or not the time otherwise allowed by law for filing
return and paying the tax has expired; and such taxes shall thereupon become immediately
due and payable .... "
2. Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 19233 (N.D. Tex. 1972). The injunction was issued pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6213. This section provides that

the Government can make no levy or proceeding in court for collection of an alleged
deficiency unless a deficiency notice has been issued to the taxpayer. Although §6213 is
generally employed with reference to the deficiency notice requirement of INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §6212(a), the court found the underlying rationale of the section equally applicable to
the notice requirement of §6861(b) of the Code. The court found that the §6861 notice requirement applied to §6851 terminations. See note 3 infra. Suits brought pursuant to §6213
are specifically excepted from the general proscription of suits in restraint of the taxing
power. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7421(a).

3.

The district court held that taxable year terminations pursuant to §6851 were gov-
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Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and HELD, a tax assessment
made pursuant to the quick termination provisions of section 6851 is a
4
"deficiency," requiring notice to the taxpayer.
Summary collection procedures5 under the present Internal Revenue Code
are triggered by the determination of the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate, that collection of revenue is jeopardized by activities of the taxpayer.
Two separate sections of the Code provide for such procedures. Section 6861
authorizes the IRS to assess a deficiency immediately and demand payment
8
thereof.
Despite this summary assessment authority, the taxpayer can suspend execution of levy under the section by petitioning the Tax Court for a redetermination of liability. 9 This section also requires that notice of deficiency be
issued to the taxpayer within sixty days after the jeopardy assessment. 10 Moreover, the IRS is forbidden to dispose of the taxpayer's assets during both the
period in which the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court and the pendency
of Tax Court litigation.".
erned by the procedural restriction of §6861. Clark v. .Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171, 177, 72-1
U.S.T.C. 19233, at 88,857 (N.D. Tex. 1972). Iwr. R v. CODE OF 1954, §6861(b) provides: "If
the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice in respect of the tax to which the
jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed under section 6121(a), then the Secretary or his
delegate shall mail a notice under such subsection within 60 days after the making of the
assessment."
4. 501 F.2d 108, 742 U.S.T.C. 19687 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. These are in contrast to ordinary deficiency procedures. Ordinarily, deficencies are
assessed at the close of the taxable year. See INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, §6211. When the Secretary or his delegate determines that there is a deficiency, the taxpayer must be notified of
the alleged deficiency. Id. §6212(a). Upon receipt of the deficiency notice, the taxpayer has
90 days (or 150 days if he is outside the United States) to petition the Tax Court for a prepayment redetermination of his liability. Id. §6213(a). Although any summary collection
procedure involves an immediate liability, deficiency notice procedure for jeopardy assessment,
contained in §6861, is substantially similar to ordinary deficiency notice procedure. The
primary difference is that, under §6861 the jeopardy taxpayer receives his deficiency notice
and the right to petition the Tax Court subsequent to assessment, while under §§6212-13
notice issues prior to assessment. Id. §§6212(a), 6213(a), 6861(a).
6. The authority has been delegated to District Directors. See Rev. Proc. 60-4, 1960-1
CuM. BULL. 877.
7. Section 6851 authorizes jeopardy assessment if the Secretary or his delegate finds that
a taxpayer designs to do "any . . . act tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly
ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax for the current or the preceding taxable
year ...." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6851(a). Section 6861 authorizes jeopardy assessment if
the Secretary or his delegate believes that "the assessment or collection of a deficiency . . .
will be jeopardized by delay ...."Id. §6861(a).
8. Id. §6861(a).
9. Id. §6863(b)(3); see note 11 infra.
10. Id. §6861(b); see note 3 supra.
11. Section 6863(b) of the Code specifically conditions the stay of summary disposal of
the taxpayer's property on existence of Tax Court jurisdiction: "(b) In the case of taxes
subject to the jurisdiction of the Tax Court .... (3) (A) Where, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6218(a), a jeopardy assessment has been made under section 6861 the property seized for the collection of the tax shall not be sold - (i) if section 6861(b) is applicable,
prior to the issuance of the notice of deficiency_ and the expiration of the time provided in
section 6213(a) for filing petition with the Tax Court, and (ii) if petition is filed with the
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A second section authorizing summary collection procedures is section
6851.12 This section differs from section 6861 in several important respects. For
example, it does not incorporate procedural restrictions on disposal of the taxpayer's property by the IRS.13 Moreover, no provision is made for either
deficiency notice or Tax Court review.14 Finally, this section contains no internal assessment authority.12 These omissions can result in hardship for the
taxpayer subjected to a quick termination under section 6851. Access to the
Tax Court for redetermination of liability prior to payment is predicated on
the existence of a deficiency; thus, the deficiency notice is a formal prerequisite
to Tax Court jurisdiction. The existence of this jurisdiction in turn invokes
the statutory limitations on summary disposal of the taxpayer's assets.17 In

Tax Court (whether before or after the making of such jeopardy assessment under section
6861), prior to the expiration of the period during which the assessment of the deficiency
would be prohibited if section 686 1(a) were not applicable."
12. See note 1 supra.
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6851. See Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1061-62,
74-1 U.S.T.C. 19242, at 83,453 (6th Cir. 1974): "Once an assessment is made under [section
6851], the I.R.S. could use its extensive statutory power to levy on the taxpayer's property
and hold a public sale to satisfy the amount of the tax. See Sec. 63331 et seq. The taxpayer
normally would have no recourse to the courts to halt these proceedings because of the provision in the code which generally prohibits suits that seek to restrain the assessment or
collection of any tax. Sec. 7421(a)."
This possibility exists because §6851 contains no provision for deficiency notice and such
notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an adjudication of tax liability by the Tax Court
prior to payment. See note 2 supra; note 16 infra. This jurisdiction in turn invokes the only
effectual restrictions on summary disposal of the taxpayer's property by the IRS prior to a
final adjudication of liability. See note 11 supra; note 17 infra.

14.

INT. REv. CODE OF

1954, §6851. See Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1061, 74-1

U.S.T.C. 19242, at 83,453 (6th Cir. 1974): "[Section 6851] generally authorizes the IRS to
make assessments of taxes but it makes no reference to a 'deficiency notice.' "

15. See

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §6851. This omission is important because it renders

§6851 dependent upon some other provision of the Code containing independent assessment
authority. If §6851 is construed to be dependent on §6201 (the general assessment provision
of the Code) for that authority, then §6851 is not subject to the procedural restrictions embodied in §6861. See Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 23-24, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 19581, at 81,859 (2d
Cir. 1973). If, on the other hand, §6851 is construed to be dependent on §6861 (which contains independent authority for jeopardy assessments) for assessment authority, then, by implication, §6851 is also subject to the procedural restrictions embodied in §6861. See Schreck
v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1268-74, 69-2 U.S.T.C. 19541, at 85,410-14 (D. Md. 1969).
16. The formal deficiency notice prescribed by §§6213(a), 6861(b), see notes 2, 4 supra,
has been described as "a ticket to the Tax Court." Corbett v. Frank, 293 F.2d 501, 502, 61-2
U.S.T.C. 19601, at 81,463 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Mason v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 388, 54-1
U.S.T.C. 19236 (5th Cir. 1954).
17. The statutory restrictions contingent upon the existence of Tax Court jurisdiction
have been summarized as follows:
"1. The IRS is required to send a deficiency notice within 60 days after the assessment,
thus enabling the jeopardy taxpayer to litigate in the Tax Court. §6861(b). If the IRS does
not comply with this requirement, the assessment and levy or seizure may be enjoined by the
federal courts. §6213(a). United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898, 64-1 U.S.T.C. 19191 (4th Cir.
1964).
"2. The jeopardy taxpayer can stay all collection action pending the Tax Court's decision
if he is able to post an adequate bond. §6863(a).
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most cases these statutory restrictions are the only effective bar to summary
disposal prior to an adjudication of liability.1s Under section 6861 the tax"3. The property seized pursuant to the assessment may not, in general, be sold during
the pendency of the litigation in the Tax Court. §6863(b)(3)(A).
"4. IRS may abate the jeopardy assessment if it finds that jeopardy does not exist.
§6861(g)."
Rambo v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1021, 1023-24, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9244, at 80,467 (W.D.
Ky. 1972).
18. Without the protections attendant upon Tax Court jurisdiction, only three forms of
relief are available to the taxpayer assessed in jeopardy pursuant to §6831. He may (1) stay
immediate enforcement of proceedings by furnishing a bond equal to the amount of the
assessment, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6851(e); (2) pay the alleged liability in full and file for
a refund in district court, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1) (1970), see Flora v. United States, 362 U.S.
145, 60-1 U.S.T.C. 19347 (1960); or (3) challenge the termination in an ordinary suit for
injunction.
Authorities frequently have noted the practical difficulties facing the taxpayer attempting
to raise bond when all of his assets have been placed beyond his control. See, e.g., Gould,
Jeopardy Assessments: When They May Be Levied and What To Do About Them, N.Y.U.
18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 937, 944-45 (1960). One court has characterized the right to file a
bond as an "illusory remedy." Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1279, 69-2 U.S.T.C.
19541, at 85,418-19 (D. Md. 1969). Another has called it a "mere mockery." Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902, 57-2 U.S.T.C. 19931, at 58,336 (S.D. Fla. 1957). Whatever potential this remedy holds for effective review, however, it still involves a financial commitment prior to a final adjudication of liability. See 301 F. Supp. at 1279, 69-2 U.S.T.C. at
85,418.
Nor does the alternative of full payment followed by a refund suit in the district court
offer fully satisfactory relief. First, the taxpayer must file a claim for refund with the Secretary and then wait six months before bringing suit. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6532(a). Moreover, a claim for refund is not effective until the end of the normal tax period that would
have existed had it not been truncated by a §6851 termination. Thus, the taxpayer may wait
up to twelve months before his claim is deemed officially of record and up to eighteen
months before it is eligible for judicial consideration. When all of his assets have been placed
beyond his disposal, such delay can work an extreme hardship on the taxpayer. Second, the
factual situation may foreclose the taxpayer's access to the district court. If (1) the IRS levies
on the taxpayer's property without applying the property seized to the tax liability assessed,
or (2) the value of the property seized does not cover the full amount of the assessment, or
(3) the IRS does not apply the property seized to the outstanding liability because of a
pending forfeiture proceeding, the taxpayer is barred from the Tax Court by the full payment rule. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 60-1 U.S.T.C. 9347 (1960). See also, 301
F. Supp. at 1281, 69-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,419-20. The Government argued in the instant case that
the remedy of the refund suit remained viable despite the operation of the Flora rule. The
contention was that Flora was inapposite to the case of a termination taxpayer because it
involved a deficiency and no deficiency is created by a §6851 termination. 501 F.2d at 125
n.55, 74-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,337 n.55. This proposition has yet to be tested in litigation. Nor
can the taxpayer realistically hope to challenge a §6851 termination through an ordinary
suit in equity. Section 7421 bars injunctions against the assessment or collection of taxes,
see note 2 supra, and the Supreme Court has developed only a very narrow exception to the
rule. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 32-3 U.S.T.C. 878 (1932). The
conditions of this exception were set out in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
370 U.S. 1, 62-2 U.S.T.C. 19545 (1962),, in which the Court held that injunction against the
assessment or collection of revenue would issue only if the taxpayer were able to show that
"under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail" and "equity jurisdiction
otherwise exists," that is, where there exists (a) the threat of irreparable injury and (b) no
adequate remedy at law. Id. at 7, 62-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,289. Obviously, such stringent conditions
are almost impossible to meet.
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payer retains title to his property until the legitimacy of the assessment is
finally determined in Tax Court. The assets of a taxpayer assessed under
section 6851, however, are subject to forcible sale before a final adjudication of
his liability. 19 In view of the less restrictive procedural requirements under
section 6851, it is not surprising that IRS reliance upon this section for sum20
mary collection procedures has increased steadily in recent years.
Dispute concerning the rights of a taxpayer subjected to quick termination
has focused on the question of whether the liability created by such action is a
"deficiency," thus entitling the taxpayer to the procedural safeguards that
attend such a determination. An early leading case on this issue, Ludwig
Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner,21 considered whether the procedural safeguards embodied in section 686122 were applicable to termination under section 6851.2 3 The court held that the provisions were independent and that no
such interrelationship was contemplated. Responding to the taxpayer's argument that section 621324 required notice where any deficiency was assessed, the
19. See notes 13, 14, 16-18 supra.
20. The IRS asserts that the jeopardy assessment power is used "sparingly," and that
care is taken to assure that the assessments are "reasonable." Schreck v. United States, 301
F. Supp. 1265, 1280 n.24, 69-2 U.S.T.C. ff9541, at 85,419 n.24 (D. Md. 1969). There were, however, 872 jeopardy assessments and terminations in fiscal 1972 in a narcotics context alone.
The number rose to 2,579 in 1973, and during the first nine months of fiscal 1974, 1,635 taxpayers were involved in jeopardy and termination assessments in narcotics-related actions.
Hearings on Taxpayer Assistance and Compliance Programs Before the Subcomm. on the
Dep't of the Treasury, U.S. Postal Serv., and General Gov't Appropriations of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 612 (1974) (statement by Mr. Hanlon, Ass't
Commissioner, IRS, Compliance). These figures contrast sharply with those for fiscal 1965, for
example, when only 520 jeopardy assessments of all kinds were made, and with those for
fiscal 1966 when only 279 such assessments occurred. 301 F. Supp. at 1280 n.24, 69-2 U.S.T.C.
at 85,419 n.24.
The increased frequency of terminations and the emergence of the issue in the instant
case seem primarily attributable to the recently manifested willingness of the IRS to employ
the §6851 assessment in conjunction with the narcotics enforcement activities of the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). See 501 F.2d at 115 n.22, 74-2 U.S.T.C. at
85,229-30 n.22. IRS cooperation with the BNDD has been largely implemented through the
Narcotics Traffickers Project (NTP), established within the IRS by President Nixon on
June 17, 1971. 2 INT. REV. SERV. MANUAL §4567.11, at 8337. According to the IRS, the
major objective of the NTP is to disrupt narcotics distribution through an intensified prograin of criminal tax prosecutions. This program is ostensibly designed to reduce illicit drugrelated profits through assessment and collection of taxes and penalties of income derived
from that source. See INT. REV. SERV. MANUAL, Intelligence Division Program and Objectives
-FY 1973, §3.01, at 28,035 (Supp. May 1, 1972). The operative theory of the program
emphasizes the importance of taking money out of the hands of drug traffickers. By February
1973, actual collections under the program totaled $12 million, with additional millions
under levy or seizure, and monthly receipts approaching S800,000. 4 INT. REV. SERv. MANUAL,
Narcotics Traffickers Project at 30,233 (Supp. Feb. 22, 1973).
21. 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
22. Id. at 840. Actually at is.ue was Int. Rev. Code of 1936, §273 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §6861).
23. Ludwig Littauer 9 Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1958). Actually at issue was
Int. Rev. Code of 1936, §146 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6851).
24. Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, at 841 (1958). Actually at
issue was Int. Rev. Code of 1936, §272 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6213).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 12
1975]

CASE COMMENTS

Littauer court reasoned that the "thing 25 created by a section 6851 termina26
tion was not a "deficiency."
Subsequent litigation has produced a divergence of case authority along
two distinct lines. The leading case reaching the Littauer result was Irving v.
Gray,27 in which the court held that a section 6851 termination neither created
a deficiency nor invoked the procedural restrictions concomitant to deficiency
procedure. 28 The court's reasoning, however, differed from that in Littauer.In
the earlier case the court had predicated assessment authority for quick termination on power inherent within section 6851.- In Irving, assessment authority
was viewed as flowing from the Code's general assessment provision, section
6201.0
In contrast to the Littauer-Irving line of cases, several jurisdictions have
found that a "deficiency" is created by a section 6851 termination.31 The
Sixth Circuit took this position in Rambo v. United States,3 2 adopting the
rationale of an earlier district court case.35 The Rambo court, turning to
statutory definitions 4 and legislative history,35 found congressional intent to
be in favor of according taxpayers procedural safeguards prior to the disposal
of attached assets.3- Having discerned such an intent, the court held that the
25. Because the issue at bar in Littauer and subsequent cases was whether the liability
created by a §6851 termination could be called a "deficiency," see notes 28, 31 infra, various
courts have employed this terminology to avoid semantically predisposing of the issue by
referring to this liability as a "deficiency" in dicta. See, e.g., Schreck v. United States, 801
F. Supp. 1265, 1274, 69-2 U.S.T.C. 19541, at 84,415 (D. Md. 1969).
26. Instead, the BTA found it to be "a provisional statement of the amount which
must presently be paid as against the impossibility of collection." Ludwig Littauer & Co. v.
Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, 842 (1938).
27. 479 F.2d 20, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 19581 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. Id. By the time Irving was decided the District of Columbia Circuit had reached a
similar conclusion in Puritan Church of America v. Commissioner, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
118,332 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 209 F.2d 306, 53-1 U.S.T.C. 119601 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954). In 1971 the Seventh Circuit took this position in Williamson v.
United States, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 5027, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 19753 (7th Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit
recently followed its Irving decision in Chapman v. IRS, 487 F.2d 1393, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 19638
(1973) and Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 19423 (1974), cert. granted, 9
CCH 1974 STAND. FE. TAX REP. 70,658.
29. Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, 841 (1938).
30. Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 24, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 19581, at 81,859 (2d Cir. 1973).
31. District courts in the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits recently took this position.
See Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 19299 (D. Ariz. 1973); Rambo v.
United States, 353 F. Supp. 1021, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9244 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Clark v. Campbell,
341 F. Supp. 171, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 19233 (N.D. Tex. 1973). Circuit courts in the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits have affirmed this stance. See 501 F.2d 108, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19687; Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 119583 (5th Cir. 1974); Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211,
74-1 U.S.T.C. 119296 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX RFP. 70,656;
Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 19242 (6th Cir. 1974).
32. 492 F.2d 1060, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 19242 (6th Cir. 1974).
33. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 69-2 U.S.T.C. 9541 (D. Md. 1969).
34. Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9242, at 83,455 (6th Cir.
1974).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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taxpayer was entitled to Tax Court review under jeopardy assessment pro3
cedures. 7
In the instant case the court adopted a rationale similar to that in Rambo.
In affirming the lower court holding that section 6861 contemplated application of the procedural restrictions therein to a section 6851 termination, the
court relied on a tripartite rationale. First, the court addressed the problem of
whether the "thing" created by a section 6851 termination fell within the
scope of the statutory definition of "deficiency."38 The IRS has consistently
maintained that the "thing" assessed is not a "deficiency" because a "deficiency" is technically that part of a tax that is past due on a prior formal
assessment.3 9 Under this view a "deficiency," by definition, cannot arise until
it is ascertainable, and that cannot occur until the close of the normal tax
year. 40 Instead of a "deficiency," the Government has contended that the
"thing" assessed in a section 6851 termination is merely a provisional statement
1
of a tax that may become due and may become a deficiency.4
In rejecting the Government's contention, the instant court first looked to
a recent case to determine how the Tax Court had previously viewed the
liability created by a section 6851 termination. 42 It concluded that the Tax
Court considered the liability assessed under section 6851 to be a final - not
merely a provisional - statement of liability. 43 Next, the court turned to the
37. Id. at 1065, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 119242, at 83,455.
38. 501 F.2d at 116-20, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 119687, at 85,231-34.
39. See, e.g., Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1274, 69-2 U.S.T.C. 119541, at
85,414-15 (D. Md. 1969). See also Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1063, 74-1 U.S.T.C.
119242, at 83,454 (6th Cir. 1974).
40. See note 39 supra.
41. Id.
42. In particular, the instant court focused on the case of Nino Sanzogno, 60 T.C. 321
(1973), cited in 501 F.2d at 118, 71-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,232.
43. In Nino Sanzogno, 60 T.C. 321 (1973), petitioner was an Italian opera conductor who
had earned approximately $8,000 in the United States in 1965. Prior to his departure for
Italy, the IRS terminated his taxable year pursuant to §6851(a) and required him to file a
form 1040C (Departing Alien Income Tax Return) before his "sailing papers" were granted.
After filing the form, the maestro was permitted to depart. Over three years later, Sanzogno
received a notice of deficiency relating to the income earned in 1965. As petitioner he argued
that the filing of form 1040C was substantial compliance with the requirements of §6501 and
thus the three-year statute of limitations had begun to run at the time of that filing and had
expired. The IRS argued that a form 1040C was not a "final return" as required by §6501
and that petitioner was required to file a form 1040B at the close of the normal tax year in
order to trigger the running of the limitation period. The Sanzogno court rejected the IRS
argument, noting that "[t]he form 1040C was a short-period return but was, nevertheless, a
return and is recognized as such in section 443(a)(3) which refers to section 6851." 60 T.C. at
325. It held that the tax assessed at the end of the short period was a final statement of
liability.
Using Sanzogno as a point of departure, the instant court concluded: "[T]he Tax Court
now appears to recognize that from the taxpayer's standpoint a section 6851 termination
brings the tax period to a close and creates a liability not unlike that which would exist at
the close of the normal tax period. Such an interpretation supports the conclusion that the
tax liability created subsequent to a section 6851 quick termination falls within the Codal
definition of deficiency as amplified by the Regulations." 501 F.2d at 119, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 119687,
at 85,233.
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statutory definitions of "deficiency" under both the present Code44 and the
1926 Code.4 5 Noting that both definitions recognized that the IRS could determine deficiencies in the absence of a return, the instant court concluded that
both definitions were broad enough to encompass the factual situation in the
instant case.46 Finally, the court concluded that, as a practical matter, both the
deficiency assessed under section 6861 and the "thing" assessed under section
47
6851 had the same effect on the taxpayer.
The second component in' the instant court's analysis involved statutory
construction. Since section 6851 contains no independent assessment power,48
49
the court examined the history of the Code to find the source of authority.
The Government argued that assessment authority for section 6851 flowed
from section 6201, the general assessment provision of the Code.50 In support
of this position, it pointed to the fact that terminations had been executed
pursuant to section 685 151 in conjunction with section 620152 before section
686153 was enacted.5 4 This fact, it maintained, refuted any contention that
section 6851 was dependent on section 6861 for assessment authority, notwithstanding the physical proximity of the two sections in the Code. 55
The instant court rejected this contention, reasoning that the introduction
in the 1926 revision of the deficiency notice requirement in cases involving
jeopardy taxpayers had altered the structure of assessment implementation.56

44. 501 F.2d at 120, 74-2 U.S.T.C. ff9687, at 85,233. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §6211 provides: "(a) In general. For purposes of this title in the case of income, estate, and gift taxes,
imposed by subtitles A and B, the term "deficiency" means the amount by which the tax
imposed by sub-titles A or B exceeds the excess of - (1) the sum of (A) the amount shown
as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made by the taxpayer and an
amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereof, plus (B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over- (2) The amount of rebates,
as defined in subsection (b)(2), made."
45. 501 F.2d at 120 n.33, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9687, at 85,233 n.33. Section 273 of the 1926
Revenue Act, the predecessor of present §6211, "recognized two classes of cases: (1) 'where
the taxpayer makes a return showing some tax liability,' and (2) 'where the taxpayer [either]
makes a return showing no tax liability or... fails to make a return.' In the second case,
'the deficiency is the amount determined to be the correct amount of the tax.' Regulation 69,
at 226 (Article 1231)." Id.
46. Id. at 119-20, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §9687, at 85,233.
47. Id. at 118, 120, 74-2 US.T.C. §9687, at 85,232-33.
48. See note 15 supra.
49. 501 F.2d at 120-22, 74-2 U.S.T.C. f9687, at 85,233-35. For the significance of this
issue, see note 15 supra.
50. 501 F.2d at 120, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §9687, at 85,234.
51. Section 250(g) of the Revenue Act of 1918 was the earliest predecessor of §6851. Id.
at 120 n.36, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §9687, at 85,234 n.36.
52. Section 3176 of the Revenue Act of 1918, a general assessment authority provision,
was the predecessor of the present §6201. Id. at 120 n.37, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §9687, at 85,234 n.37.
53. Section 6861 was first enacted into law as §279(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926. Id. at
120 n.36, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §9687, at 85,234 n.36.
54. Id. at 120, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §f9687, at 85,234.
55. In the present Code, §§6851, 6861 appear together under the general heading: "Subchapter A -Jeopardy." INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, Subtitle F, ch. 70A, pts. L 11.
56. 501 F.2d at 120-22, 74-2 U..T.C. §9687, at 85,234-35.
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Upon examining contemporaneous expressions of congressional intent, 7 the
court concluded that the application of deficiency notice procedure to all types
of deficiency brought with it a new operative system of Tax Court construction. s This new approach superseded the prior system, in which disparate
assessment provisions drew authority from a single blanket authorization. The
1926 revision created a more interdependent system of tax code provisions:
those that were intended to be self-actuating were vested with an independent
assessment authority, while those provisions that were not so vested drew
implementation powers from the logically affiliated assessment provision. 59
In light of this historical analysis, the instant court concluded that section
6851 was intended to draw assessment authority from section 6861 and was
thus implicitly subject to the procedural restrictions of the latter section.60
The third component of the instant court's rationale focused on policy.
Here the court employed a balancing test. Relying on "[t]he clear Congressional intention to provide all taxpayers with a forum in which to contest
income tax liability prior to payment,"61 the court expressed concern that the
procedurally unfettered use of section 6851 was not consonant with that purpose.62 The court also examined the many obstacles impeding effective review
of a nalleged tax liability in the absence of a Tax Court redetermination, 63
and emphasized the practical hardships imposed upon a taxpayer forced to
rely on post-payment remedies.64 Finally, the court noted that increased reliance on section 6851 without attendant procedural restrictions could result
57. In determining the intent of the drafters of the 1926 Code, which applied deficiency
notice procedure to jeopardy assessments under §6861, the instant opinion quoted from the
1924 Congressional Record: "The right of appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete
remedy, and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assessment ....
[The taxpayer] is entitled to an appeal and to a determination of his liability for the tax
prior to its payment. H.R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)." Id. at 122, 74-2

U.S.T.C. 9687, at 85,235.
58. The court said: "The evolution of our revenue system from an unintegrated collection of separate revenue acts through two careful codifications may well create new affiliations between long existent, but formerly disparate provisions." Id. at 120, 74-2 U.S.T.C.

119687, at 85,235.
59. "[T]ax procedure has been structured to provide for ordinary uncontested assessment,
normal year-end deficiency assessment, and jeopardy assessment. Section 6201 provides the
ordinary assessment authority, section 6213 provides assessment authority for the year-end
deficiency situation, and section 6861 provides authority for jeopardy assessments." Id. at 121,
74-2 U.S.T.C. §f9687, at 85,234-35.
60. Id. at 122, 74-2 U.S.T.C. §f9687, at 85,235.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See the instant court's discussion of the right to file a bond, id. at 123, 74-2 U.S.T.C.
V9687, at 85,236, and the right to file for a refund suit in district court subsequent to full
payment. Id. at 124-25, 74-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,237-38. See note 18 supra.
64. As an illustration of this hardship, the instant court said: "The action of freezing
the assets of the taxpayers prevents them from paying fire insurance premiums on their
property, making necessary repair;, paying real estate taxes and from using their funds for
the protection of their property and for ordinary living expenses." 501 F.2d at 123, 74-2,
U.S.T.C. §f9687, at 85,236, quoting Gould Jeopardy Assessments: When They May Be Levied
and What To Do About Them, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 939 (1960).
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in the elimination of Tax Court review "for all jeopardy situations, both
[section] 6851 and [section] 6861."65
Having identified the dangers inherent in leaving section 6851 free of procedural safeguards, the instant court searched for a countervailing "prejudice
to any legitimate governmental interest66 attributable to a Tax Court redetermination," 67 but could find none. Even if section 6851 were subject to procedural protections, "the Government will still be able to seize all of the taxpayer's available assets ... prior to the Tax Court proceeding." 68 Hence, the
court concluded that application of deficiency notice procedures to the section
6851 assessment would in no way jeopardize the collection of revenue. 69 Therefore, the court found no legitimate governmental interest in denying jeopardy
taxpayers the right of prepayment review.70
Underlying the instant decision were largely unexpressed policy notions. As
in many of the preceding jeopardy cases,71 situational equities played a prom65. 501 F.2d at 122, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19687, at 85,235 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. The Government has argued that such a legitimate interest exists in the speed
needed to cope with the most compelling of jeopardy situations. Concomitantly, the Government maintains that it was the intent of the drafters of the present Code to create in
§§6851 and 6861 a range of procedures gradient in expeditousness to accommodate jeopardy
situations of varying urgency. See, e.g., Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1271, 69-2
U.S.T.C. 19541, at 85,413 (D. Md. 1969).
67. 501 F.2d at 126, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19687, at 85,230.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 126, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19687, at 85,238.
70. Id.
71. In most of these cases, notions of equity and due process create a distinctive undertone that cannot be ignored, although deference to the taxation function precludes the
characterization of the issues as such. The disposal of the technical issue, however, usually
seems to serve the underlying equities involved. See, e.g., Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 73-2
U.S.T.C. 19581 (2d Cir. 1973). The Irving court apparently was influenced in its decision by
the fact that petitioners Clifford Irving, Edith Irving, and Richard Suskind were the
perpetrators of the spectacular hoax involving the "biography" of Howard Hughes. In determining that petitioners were not entitled to injunctive relief, the court quoted from the
lower court's opinion, noting that "it is bearable inequity that these whose 'bold plans' are
frustrated may suffer potentially costly inconveniences." Irving v. Gray, 344 F. Supp. 567, 573,
cited in 479 F.2d at 25, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 19581, at 81,859. Although this quoted passage was
offered in answer to petitioners' prayer for equitable relief (as opposed to relief under
§6861), the fact that it appeared in the opinion indicates a probable predisposition on the

part of the Irving court toward the larger issue concerning the nature of §6851 liability.
See also Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19583 (5th Cir. 1974). In holding that a taxpayer assessed under §6851 is entitled to the protections of §6861, the Willits
court obviously was influenced in its disposal of the technical issue by the specious nature of
the IRS position in that case. The court noted: "The evidence adduced established such a
gossamer basis for the drastic actions of the Internal Revenue Service that they cannot be
sustained." 497 F.2d at 245, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 18583, at 84,835. The degree to which situational
equities influenced the final decision is apparent in a passage near the end of the Willits
opinion: "The IRS has been given broad power to take possession of the property of citizens
by summary means that ignore many basic tenets of pre-seizure due process in order to prevent the loss of tax revenues. Courts cannot allow these expedients to be turned on citizens
suspected of wrongdoing -not as tax collection devices but as summary punishment to sup-

plement or complement regular criminal procedures. The fact that they are cloaked in the
garb of a tax collection and applied only by the Narcotic Project to those believed to be
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inent role in the final decision. The instant court was obviously influenced by
the propensity of the IRS using the tax code as a means of circumventing
judicial obstructions to criminal prosecution. 7 2 For this reason, the decision
can be viewed as an expression of the court's concern that taxation not become
an alternate means of criminal enforcement where procedural restrictions have
rendered prosecution impracticable.
The instant decision implements the tenet that a forum should be afforded
anyone whose property rights are jeopardized by government action, unless a
legitimate governmental interest militates against such review.73 Procedural
engaged in or associated with the narcotics trade must not bootstrap judicial approval of
such use." Id. at 246, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19583, at 84,836.
72. See 501 F.2d at 117-18 n.28, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19687, at 85,231-32 n.28, in which the
instant court documents recent tax prosecutions, emphasizing the arbitrariness of the assessments.
73. In the instant case the district court warned vaguely of an impending collision with
constitutional principles if the IRS continued to pursue its present policies. 341 F. Supp. 171,
176, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 19233, at 83,857 (N.D. Tex. 1972). A large part of the due process issue
hovering in the background in the instant case concerns the general rule that due process
requires notice and hearing before the sovereign may lawfully seize an individual's property.
See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). As presently used, §6851 affords the taxpayer no such opportunity. Subsequent to termination under §6851 and assessment pursuant
to §6201, the taxpayer's property is immediately levied upon under the provisions of
§6331(a). See INT. REv.CODE OF 1954, §§6201, 6331(a), 6851; note 13 supra.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned summary procedures for the assessment and collection
of taxes, see Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 2 U.S.T.C. f743 (1931), conditioned,
however, upon the existence of an "adequate later determination" of tax liability. This
stipulation was fixed with an eye to the immediate redetermination of liability available to
the taxpayer under the facts of the Phillips case. 283 U.S. at 597-98, 2 U.S.T.C. 1743, at
2760 (1931). Because the Government refuses to classify §6851 liability as a deficiency, not
only may the taxpayer's assets be seized without recourse to a prepayment forum, see notes
13-14, 16-17 supra, but he is denied prompt postseizure review as well. Under the statute of
limitations the IRS has three years in which to assess a deficiency and issue notice. Moreover, the IRS has six years to do so if the taxpayer files a return that omits more than 25%
of property includable in gross income and an unlimited period if the taxpayer fails to file
a return. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6501(a), (c)(2)-(3), (e)(i)(A). The resolution of this issue thus turns partly on whether §6851, as interpreted by the IRS, even affords an adequate
opportunity for postseizure review, the minimal requirement of due process in summary
procedures as established in Phillips.
This is only part of the due process difficulty presented here, however. Recent cases have
emphasized that summary seizure of property is proper only if it is carried out in deference
to a legitimate and overriding governmental interest. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 90-92 (1972). As justification for summary taxation procedures, such an interest traditionally has been found in the governmental need to collect tax revenues. See Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 2 U.S.T.C. 743 (1931). Thus, the constitutional propriety of
employing a tax prosecution where criminal enforcement, as opposed to collection of revenues, is the primary objective is questionable. That such enforcement is the primary objective of the NTP is supported by IRS documents. See note 20 supra. It is also apparent
from a comparison of average amounts assessed in non-narcotics-related and narcotics-related
action. In 1973, for example, 135 non-narcotics-related termination assessments were made,
totaling $8,001. The average assessment per taxpayer was under sixty dollars. Hearings on
Taxpayer Assistance, supra note 20, at 612. Although complete statistics are unavailable, in
eight cases involving narcotics-related terminations, the average assessment was $45,296.65 per
taxpayer. Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19520 (4th Cir. 1974) ($27,261.85);
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